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PROPOSITIONS (STELLINGEN)
ACCOMPANYING THE THESIS
BEYOND BELIEF: ON REASONING IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL GAMES
BY
NIELS MOURMANS
1. In epistemic game theory one takes a one-person perspective of a game in
order to model the reasoning behind choices, instead of a bird’s eye view
that can only see outcomes of a game.
2. Beliefs are a crucial part of individual decision-making, both in terms of
reasoning towards a choice as well as shaping preferences.
3. In game theory we use the rational player that adheres to solution concepts
as a benchmark. This benchmark serves as a solid basis to develop and com-
pare alternative models that try to explain deviations from standard theory.
4. Utilities can directly depend on an entire belief hierarchy in psychological
games.
5. In the Surprise Exam Paradox, the correct beliefs assumption is incompatible
with the belief-dependent motivation of surprise-seeking.
6. When we extend a traditional game by letting one or more players also have
motivations that depend on any higher-order belief, iterative elimination of
strictly dominated choices can already fail in characterizing rational choices
under common belief in rationality.
7. In psychological games, reasoning about two different rationality-events of
expressing k-fold and k’-fold belief in rationality may impose conflicting
restrictions on the same higher-order belief.
8. The more complex reasoning in line with common belief in rationality be-
comes, the less one can expect a boundedly rational agent to act in line with
such reasoning. As a result, predictions made by practitioners based on such
a solution concept can lose accuracy.
9. There is a lot more to find of interest in the wide outside world than inside
any single office, room or apartment. Make use of that.
10. “We suffer more often in imagination than we do in reality.”
- Lucius Annaeus Seneca
